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Abstract 
By analysing the evolution of FDI in Romania during 2007-2011, the present paper try to highlight some of the challenging 
aspects related to the fiscal policy and FDI relation from the viewpoint of the sustainable development requirements for 
rformance with respect to convergence and competitiveness after its EU 
integration. In this purpose the paper focuses on two different fiscal tools 
decision, i.e. corporate tax rate and/or provision of public inputs. The paper provides a new perspective on the issue of why 
FDI are attracted or not by the emergent countries. The study is based on the hypothesis that the competition among 
countries for attracting FDI does not represent the final goal, but a means for sustainable development and economic-social 
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1. Introduction  
     The multiple benefits of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows on the host economy and the profits for the 
multinational companies were the subject for many researchers: Estrin and Meyer, 2004; Resmini, 2000; 
Kostevc et al., 2007. The positive impact of FDI on economic growth has been confirmed by a number of 
studies: Neuhaus, 2006; Lunn, 1980; Buckleyet et al, 2002; Carkovic and Levine, 2002; De Mello, 1999. These 
effects are especially important in the context of economic development and represent a reason why countries, 
trying to promote economic growth, engage in competition for FDI: Billington, 1999; Aleksynka, 2003. The 
literature in the field reveals that, due to the globalization of the world economy, the importance of market size 
diminishes more and more and small countries are able successfully to compete as well, intensifying the 
competition even further: Oman, 2000; Blomström and Kokko, 2003. The literature on the subject of corporate 
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taxation in European Member States, as a determinant for FDI, is fuelled 
tax harmonization or is tax competition the best solution to the awkward state of asymmetric tax rates that 
s run the gamut 
from entirely pro-harmonization to pure pro-competition stances: Smith, 1999; Stults, 2009; Nerudova, 2008. 
Some researches reveal that higher tax jurisdictions in the EU offer qualified labour force and stable business 
environment: Smith, 1999. According to Mitchell, 2002 tax competition generates responsible tax policy 
because the increased capital mobility toward low tax jurisdictions. Tax competition can be considered a very 
important factor supporting the economic liberalization of the world by creating the pressure on decrease in tax 
rates, important especially for emergent countries in order to achieve the performance with respect to 
convergence and competitiveness Gondor and Nistor, 2012b. Some researchers consider that from the 
perspective of potential foreign investors, the general business environment may be more important than 
specific incentives Meyer, 2005. The business environment includes some aspects that can be influenced by 
 approval or registration of new businesses, or the 
: World Bank, 2005.   In another recent work, we have argued that FDI is 
concentrated mainly in the developed economies despite the higher level of taxation, concluding that higher tax 
rates create better business environment: Gondor and Nistor, 2012a. The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows: Section 2 describes the data and discusses our empirical strategy regarding the FDI in Romania. 
Section 3 presents our main results on the estimated effect of fiscal policy on the location of FDI and Section 4 
concludes. 
2. Data and Empirical Methodology   
    The analysis of FDIs patterns and dynamics in Romania mainly refers to the period 2007-2010, using data 
from National Bank of Romania (available only until the end of 2010 at the time of the analysis). Together with 
FDI inflows we use FDI stock because we are interested to study the FDI structure in Romania by countries of 
origin and capital stocks are a closer proxy to multilateral activity than investment inflows.  
       
Table 1. The evolution of FDI during 2007- 2010 in Romania 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
FDI inflows (million EUR) 7.250 9.496 3.488  2.200 
FDI 1/0 (million EUR) NA 2.246 -6.008 -1.288 
I FDI1/0 (%) NA 130.98 36.73 63.07 
FDI stock (million EUR) 42.770 48.798 49.984 52.585 
FDI stock 1/ 0(million EUR) NA 6.028 1186    2.601 
I FDI stock1/0 (%) NA 114.09 102.43 105.20 
 
   As it can be seen in table 1, during 2007-2010 the FDI volume grew relatively quickly in Romania, due to the 
relatively higher profit opportunities that could be valorised in Romania by foreign investors. The year 2008 is 
the record year in terms of FDI inflows for the analyzed period. The level of FDI inflows was 9496 million 
euro, which means an increase of 30.98% compared to 2007. Between 2009 and 2011 the FDI inflows have 
decreased dramatically. The largest decrease was recorded in 2009 by 6.008 million euro compared to 2008, 
meaning a decrease of 63.27%. In 2009 and 2010, Romania attracted FDI inflows in amount of 5.688 million 
euro, well below the level reached in 2008. Although the FDI stock has increased during 2007 - 2010, it can be 
observed that after 2008 the growth was smaller compared to the FDI inflows. This shows that after 2008 there 
were many investors who left Romania. As the media reported, in 2008, the ice cream production capacity of 
Nestlé moved from Romania to Bulgaria; In 2009, Kraft Foods ice cream production capacity was also 
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relocated to Bulgaria and Coca Cola moved from Romania to Moldova. They were followed by other investors 
such as Nokia, Van Melle, Tnuva. Knowing that corporate tax rate in Bulgaria is 10 % (the lowest in EU) and 
in Moldova is 0, we can assume that the investors' decision can be attributed to lower taxation in these 
countries comparing with Romania, where corporate tax rate (CTR) is 16%. 
 
Table 2. The FDI stock distribution during 2007- 2010 in Romania by countries of origin and CTR 
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 CTR 2007-2010 
(%) 
Total (million Euro)  
Of which (%): 
42.770 48.798 49.984 52.585  
Netherlands 16.3 17.2 21.8 20.7 25.0 
Austria 21.4 18.8 18.1 17.8 25.0 
Germany 11.7 15.4 13.4 12.2 29.8 
France 8.8 8.8 8.5 8.3 34.4 
Greece 7.5 6.5 6.6 5.7 35.0 
Italy 6.1 7.3 5.1 5.3 31.4 
Cyprus 4.7 3.9 4.7 4.9 10.0 
Switzerland 5.1 4.7 4.2 3.8 21.2 
United States of America - 1.8 2.1 2.6 35.0 
Spain 1.1 1.2 1.7 2.0 30.0 
Luxemburg 1.5 2.3 1.3 1.9 28.6 
Czech Republic 0.8 0.7 1.2 1.8 19.0 
Belgium 1.1 0.5 2.2 1.6 34.0 
Hungary 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.4 20.6 
Great Britain 0.9 1.5 1.0 1.2 26.0 
Turkey 1.9 1.2 1.1 1.2 20.0 
Other countries (less than 1% each)      5.83 6.4 5.4 7.6  
   
     As it can be seen in table 2, the distribution of the FDI stock origin 
highlights an unequal distribution between countries and a concentration of the latter in EU countries. In the 
analyzed period, over 50% of the stock of FDI inflows in Romania comes from Netherlands, Austria and 
Germany, countries with more than 10% in total FDI in Romania each of them. They are followed by France, 
Greece and Italy with more than 5% each of them. Regarding the CTR, as it can be seen in table 2, except 
Cyprus, all countries of origin of FDI enforce much higher CTR comparing with host country Romania. 
3. Data Analysis and Discussions 
       We assume that competing countries can influence FDI flows up to a certain level by using fiscal policy 
instruments as strategic tools. For example, governments of competing countries can attract FDI by using a low 
corporate tax rate or they can invest in additional production of public inputs which may be of productive use 
to the investors. Both of these policies need to be financed by an optimal fiscal policy. Since competing 
countries are different, their optimal policies usually differ. In this perspective, a question arises
ons 
 
   Analyzing the above presented dynamics and structures of FDI in Romania during 2007-2010 (table 1 and 
table 2) together with the researches in the field we tried to find out why foreign firms invest in Romania and 
why so many foreign investors left Romania in recent years. The Scientific literature provides us some answers. 
According to Neo-classical investment model the investment should be a function of expected future interest 
rate, prices and taxes: 
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pursue one or both of two objectives: access to local markets through local production and/or sale of imported 
products; export-oriented production on the basis of local resources such as low cost labor, natural resources, or 
(less common) human capital (Klaus, 2005). Most researchers agree that FDI is attracted to countries offering 
profit opportunities: OECD, 2008; Vintila 2010; Krautheim and Eisenlohr, 2011. Based on these research 
results this study will try to determine the way in which the government can influence the profit opportunities 
for foreign investors considering that actions in the general taxation field must comply with the general aim of 
the EC Treaty which requires to avoid excessive deficits. By taking into consideration the reduction of the 
importance of market size due to the globalization of the world economy, in the present study the asymmetry 
between Romania and the other competing countries is created by the assumption of differences in fiscal 
policies, instead of the assumption of differences in market size; as a result, the market size aspect 
is neglected. As a consequence the Romanian markets is assumed to be perfectly integrated with no 
administrative trade barriers and with tariffs and transportation costs both equal to zero. Considering that in 
terms of economic development level the competing countries are clustered on two general categories i.e. 
developed and emergent economies, we consider Romania as part of the latter. The economic development 
level of Romania represents a source of asymmetry which, according to the empirically observations is 
reflected in the smaller capital stock, low infrastructure, low supplies of other public goods and smaller wages. 
Based on the above presented sources of asymmetry we tried to build a production function with three 
arguments: Y = F (K, LC, PI), where Y denotes the output, K denotes the capital, LC denotes labour cost and PI 
denotes public inputs. A production function is a relationship that indicates the maximum level of the 
production Y which can be obtained from various combinations of arguments, irrespective of the technology. 
We assume that: 
 
1. P>0, K>0, LC>0, PI>0                                                                                                                    (1) 
 
2. The absence of the production factors determines a zero output: 
 
              0,,lim
0
PILCKf                                                                                                                    (2) 
 
3. The absence of a single factor of  production  leads to a zero output: 
 
0),,(lim),,(lim,,lim
000
PILCKfPILCKfPILCKf                                                   (3) 
 
4. Government levies capital tax in order to finance the supply of public inputs. Assuming that the entire 
amount is used for financing public goods, 
 
 KTr = PI , with PI,Tr 0 ,                                                                                                                 (4)            
              
  Where Tr denotes tax rate on capital K.   
Not to complicate the model we consider that Tr is the corporate tax rate. In the future work we will take into 
consideration the payroll taxes and possibly other taxes on business (e.g. property tax). By using fiscal tools in 
order to attract FDI the government is not allowed to discriminate between domestic and foreign firms 
therefore the same tax rate  capital. The government can raise 
capital tax and use the revenue for the production of public inputs that enter the production function for all 
investors affecting the profit of the foreign investor in the country in which he decides to invest. Thus, a higher 
supply of public goods can help attract the foreign investor. Following taxation, the investors will calculate the 
disposable income DI and the profit P. 
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DI = Y  KTr                                                                                                                                       (5) 
 
P = Y-C-KTr = F (K, LC, PI)-C-KTr,                                                                                                 (6)          
Where C denotes the input costs. 
 
   From the equation (6) it is clear that the investor profit is negatively related to the taxation level, therefore 
lower taxation will generate higher profit.  
But, on the other hand, t to the supply of public inputs: 
 
             10
PI
P    And      0
2
2
PI
P                                                                                                            (7) 
 
     Since the public inputs depend on the taxation level (equation 4), the government in competition for 
attracting FDI has to face an equilibrium problem between additional output/profit of companies due to higher 
supply of public goods and  the possibly higher tax burden which reduces the output/profit of investors.  
The results reveal that FDI is attracted to countries offering: access to markets and profit opportunities, low 
taxation, low cost of labour and well-developed infrastructure. All of these factors will influence the long-term 
profitability of a project. It results that there may be situations in which a less developed economy will attract 
foreign direct investment depending on the taxation level, labour cost differential and the ability of the 
government to spend efficiently the public revenue for the supply of public inputs. The table 2 shows the high 
differences between the CTR in Romania and the CTR in countries of origin of the main investors in Romania. 
Based on this reality and taking into the consideration the importance of the infrastructure, the solution could 
be the increase of taxation in Romania for investing in public goods. But considering the actual economic level 
of Romania we agree that the business environment cannot bear a higher tax burden. More than that, based on 
our researches we stand for a reduction of business taxation especially of the payroll taxes, considering their 
incentive role. As a consequence, the priorities to be supported by fiscal policy in order to attract FDI in 
Romania refer to the following: creating a business-friendly tax administration marked by certainty, 
predictability, consistency and timeliness in the application of tax rule, certainty of tax treatment, in many cases 
these considerations being as important as the effective tax rate paid. The above measures do not require 
supplementary public funds. In order to obtain public revenues for the supply of public inputs e.g. 
infrastructure, our recommendations are the following: reducing tax avoidance and tax fraud and stopping or at 
least reducing the waste of public revenues, both representing huge revenue sources for  the required public 
inputs. 
 
4. Conclusion 
     
of winning the investment. According to our researches we can conclude that a tax reduction is able to attract 
FDI but it is not sufficient. Even the investors who have chosen to invest in Romania being attracted by low 
taxation have reconsidered their position by seeking other opportunities for profit in other locations. It becomes 
clear that a low tax burden cannot compensate for a generally weak or unattractive FDI environment. Tax is but 
one element and cannot compensate for poor infrastructure, limited access to markets, or other weak 
investment conditions. A low corporate tax rate will not attract the FDI if the fiscal policy generates an 
unfriendly business environment marked by unpredictability, lock of transparency, fiscal ambiguity, tax 
avoidance and tax fraud; a high corporate tax rate will stimulate the FDI flows if the revenue is used to provide 
public goods that improve the environment in which investors operate. 
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